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The Paris Agreement of December 2015, which entered into force on 4 November 2016, has 
committed countries collectively to keep global warming to well below an average of 2oC. So 
far countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to GHG emissions reduction fall 
far short of that required to achieve this target, and in many countries the policies to achieve 
even these NDCs are not in place. This has made more important than ever an understanding 
of the wide range of available GHG abatement policies and how they may be combined for 
an efficient and effective delivery of the very large cuts in GHG emissions that delivery of 
the 2oC target will require. 
 
The aim of the CECILIA2050 project1, which concluded in October 2015, was precisely to 
understand how climate policy instruments work in interaction, what factors determine 
performance, and how the European Union (EU)’s climate policy mix should evolve to 
transition to a low-carbon economy. In doing so, it aimed to take a broader view on policy 
instruments and their performance – not only to describe what would work best in theory, but 
also to investigate the various technological, legal, political or cultural constraints that 
climate policies need to overcome – or to work around. Although the focus of the project was 
the countries of the EU, many of the lessons of the project may be applied more widely. This 
collection of papers contains many of the most important insights from the research 
undertaken by the different CECILIA2050 project partners2. 
 
That said, it is clear that the papers in this Special Issue can do no more than explore some of 
the many issues raised by the complexities of climate policy. These issues include the 
conceptual basis and political economy underlying climate policy instrumentation; the 
various options of different energy system architectures and their practical implications; 
stakeholder perceptions of policy approaches to emission reduction, and public willingness to 
bear any costs incurred; financial barriers to low-carbon innovation; and the international 
implications of EU climate policy in the absence of similar policies in other countries.  
 
The eight papers in this Special Issue are organised as follows. The first four papers (Huppes 
et al., Mehling et al., Drummond and Ekins, Kalfagianni et al.) examine from different 
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perspectives EU climate and energy policy, in relation to both CO2 and non-CO2 GHG 
emissions, while placing such policy in a global context. Such policy must deliver 
increasingly transformative change, as illustrated by energy system modelling conducted by 
Solano-Rodriguez et al., who find an important role for bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS) in achieving emissions reductions in the EU consistent with meeting the 
2oC target globally. Costs associated with such a transformation are also computed and 
reported. There then follows a paper (Ščasný et al.,) that looks at households’ willingness to 
pay for the EU’s climate policy with different emission reduction targets.  
 
One of the objectives, and necessary results, of climate policy is the stimulation of low-
carbon innovation. The subject of the paper by Mazzanti et al. is the financial barriers to such 
innovation and the policies that can address them. The final paper in this Special Issue, by 
Gonzalez-Eguino et al., reveals the danger that reducing GHG emissions from land use in one 
part of the world could lead to significant terrestrial leakage of carbon emissions, as other 
countries increase food and bioenergy production. The papers are briefly discussed in turn so 
that the overall narrative of this Special Issue becomes clear. 
 
Huppes et al. note that climate policy can easily fall into incoherence if policy instruments 
intended to reduce emissions efficiently (for example, the EU Emissions Trading System, EU 
ETS) are combined with instruments seeking to promote particular low-carbon technologies. 
Price reduction of the emission permits, rather than additional emission reduction, is the 
likely result. In thinking about overall policy design, Huppes et al. draw a distinction between 
Institutionalist approaches, and those based on Planning and Control. Huppes et al. identify 
the latter with utilitarianism and welfare theory, and hence with the neo-classical approach to 
policy, but with a focus broadened to cover ethical issues as well. The Institutionalist 
approach focuses on centralised arrangements, such as legal systems, the design of markets, 
and the boundaries between the public and private sectors. With this distinction he then 
categorises different climate policy instruments across different energy-using sectors, and 
compares them for effectiveness, efficiency and feasibility. Huppes et al.’s conclusion is that, 
while these two approaches can be combined, for coherence the governance of climate policy 
needs to be predominantly based on one or the other. While both approaches can be effective, 
efficiency depends on keeping the policy mix as simple and internally consistent as possible, 
while covering all emission sources. 
 
One of the main differences between Huppes et al.’s two approaches is that his Institutionalist 
strategy “concentrates on decentralized independence and the role of civil society”, while the 
Planning and Control approach involves more centralisation of technology decisions. This is 
the main policy distinction explored in detail by Mehling et al., asking whether EU climate 
policy has become more centralised as it has increased in ambition, with centralisation 
identified as the degree of legal bindingness, European harmonisation and EU-level 
institution-building. The paper discusses the relative advantages and weaknesses of both 
centralisation and decentralisation, considered as a spectrum rather than a dichotomy and as 
part of a broader framework of multi-level governance, from the global to sub-national levels. 
It also explores these advantages and disadvantages especially in relation to the EU ETS and 
renewable energy policies. The two areas exhibit opposite policy tendencies, the EU ETS 
having become more centralised through its phases, while renewable energy policy has 
become more decentralised in consideration of the 2020 and 2030 targets, the former being 
binding on individual MS, the latter binding only on the EU as a whole. Mehling et al. 
conclude that there is no necessary correlation between centralisation and level of ambition, 
with the position of climate policy on the centralisation-decentralisation spectrum being as 
much determined by broader EU-Member State (MS) relations as by energy and climate 
considerations. 
 
The third of the broader policy papers (Drummond and Ekins) conducts a sectoral analysis of 
the different climate policies in the EU, with a view to assessing whether the policies 
currently in place at the EU level, and at MS level as a direct result of EU-level policies, are 
likely to meet the decarbonisation requirements of a number of low-carbon scenarios. All the 
scenarios considered point to almost total decarbonisation of the power sector by 2050. The 
principal EU-level instrument aimed at power sector decarbonisation is the EU ETS. Despite 
the current surplus of allowances, the EU ETS emissions trajectory to 2050 is consistent with 
near-zero carbon emissions from the sector by 2050. Derailment of this outcome is most 
likely to come from a failure to reform the EU electricity market to take account of the 
increasing proportion of near-zero marginal costs renewables on the system, which is making 
all forms of power generation capacity difficult to finance. EU electricity market reform 
therefore emerges as a policy priority. 
 
The EU ETS is also the main EU-wide policy instrument for reducing emissions from the 
industrial sector, with the difference from power generation that most of the industries in the 
EU ETS are considered at risk of carbon leakage and therefore receive free permit allocation, 
rather than having to buy them. In theory this should not affect the incentive for firms to 
reduce their emissions, but in practice, taking into consideration also the low permit price, 
firms are unlikely to prioritise emissions reduction as a result of this policy instrument. 
Certainly the projected 2030 permit price of €30/tonne CO2 is not adequate to stimulate wide 
take-up of the types of decarbonisation technologies, at the scale that is required to meet the 
long-term decarbonisation objectives – such as industrial carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technology, which many scenarios consider to be essential to reach the very high levels of 
emission reduction envisaged for the EU in 2050 (80-95% from 1990’s level). While the 
Energy Efficiency Directive of 2012 mandates industry to identify energy efficiency 
opportunities, it remains voluntary for firms to take up these opportunities once they have 
been discovered, and it remains to be seen whether firms do this on a large enough scale for 
this to lead to significant reductions in energy consumption.  
 
The EU ETS does not apply to the final two sectors considered: buildings and transport. With 
respect to buildings, improvements in energy efficiency from building fabric insulation, and 
from the performance of energy-using appliances are likely to be the main source of emission 
reductions. Both of these are driven by regulation (including mandatory efficiency standards) 
combined with information for consumers. In the case of transport, the main tool at the EU 
level is fleet average emission standards expressed as gCO2/km. However, the effectiveness 
of this approach was seriously compromised by the revealed difference between emissions 
performance in tests and on the road. Another tool is road fuel duties, minimum levels of 
which are set by the Energy Tax Directive - yet raising these minimum levels has proven 
difficult, due to the required unanimity from MS.  
 
While power generation, industry, buildings and transport are the main CO2 producing 
sectors, the principal source of non-CO2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is the agri-food 
sector. With a strong emphasis on CO2 emission reduction in the EU, non-CO2 GHGs are 
estimated to comprise a significant proportion of the remaining overall EU GHG emissions in 
2050. Reducing non-CO2 GHGs is difficult due to the large number of diffuse emitters and 
the lack of readily available abatement options, and there are currently no EU-wide policy 
instruments in place to achieve significant emission reductions – let alone the roughly 45% 
reduction in these emissions that will be required to reach the 80% overall GHG emission 
reduction target for 2050. By interviewing representatives from four groups (government, 
private sector, interest groups and experts) in four EU countries (UK, Netherlands, Italy, 
Spain), Kalfagianni et al. explore stakeholder views as to the environmental effectiveness, 
economic efficiency and political feasibility of different policies to reduce non-CO2 GHGs. 
 
In all the countries, voluntary approaches to non-CO2 GHG abatement predominated and 
were most favoured by farmers. The most developed voluntary approach was in the 
Netherlands, where negotiated agreements, or covenants, involving targets, tax incentives and 
subsidies, and sometimes backed up by regulations, are a common means of implementing 
environmental policies. Even so, in the Netherlands as well as in the other countries, there 
was dissatisfaction with the prevailing policy approach, and some disagreement as to how 
further policies should be developed. Although there was recognition of the need for action 
on emission reduction, there was also, perhaps not surprisingly, general antagonism to 
policies that would raise costs. The research revealed a desire for the EU to develop policy in 
this area, that provides a level playing field for all EU farmers and a fair distribution of costs 
between the different parts of the food supply chain. 
These four papers setting the EU climate policy scene prepare the ground for the energy 
system modelling reported in Solano-Rodriguez et al. They use the UCL European TIMES 
model (ETM) to explore relative reductions in sectoral CO2 emissions in a cost-optimal 
pathway of EU decarbonisation that achieves the EU target of an 80% reduction in GHG 
emissions by 2050. The main result here is that the power generation sector leads the energy 
system decarbonisation, making extensive use of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS), generating net-negative CO2 emissions from the sector. CCS is also deployed in 
industry because of the lack of cheaper means of reducing industrial process emissions. There 
are options that could substantially reduce the need for BECCS, which is at present a largely 
unproven technology: this includes, for instance, mode switching (for example to walking 
and cycling) in urban transport, or options for increasing the energy efficiency of the urban 
fabric. Both of these, however, are absent in the model because of the difficulties of 
representing them effectively. Moreover, the modelling approach chosen essentially 
examines the options for decarbonising the power sector based on a centralised power system 
plus BECCS, rather than a wider system transformation based on the declining cost of 
renewables, system management (including the demand side) and integration technologies. It 
is currently unclear which of these options, or what mixture of them, will be the outcome of 
innovation, policy measures and consumer preferences. 
 
The policy implications here are threefold. First, policy makers should increase the stringency 
of the kinds of decarbonisation policies for transport and buildings that were described in the 
earlier papers, in order to reduce the extent to which they need to rely on the still very 
uncertain BECCS technology. Second, that even with transport and buildings playing a major 
role in decarbonisation, CCS is likely to be necessary, for both for the power and industrial 
sectors. This underscores the desirability of the EU reinvigorating its currently stalled CCS 
deployment strategy. And third, that policy makers and those in charge of grid balancing and 
system operation need to be aware of any shifts away from centralisation of power generation 
towards more distributed networks, and be prepared to act to encourage these to the extent 
considered desirable while maintaining grid integrity and stability. 
 
The energy system decarbonisation simulated in the Solano-Rodriguez et al. paper is not 
prohibitively expensive. Although a carbon price of USD300/tCO2 in 2050 may seem high by 
today’s standards, in the 2050 economy, which has undergone a structural transformation to a 
low-carbon economy, with a large increase in energy productivity, such a price signal, spread 
out over a number of years, would be economically manageable and considerably less 
disruptive than some of the price volatility regularly seen in oil markets. Likewise, a 14% 
increase in energy system costs is substantial – but since this rise will be spread out over 30 
years, the year-to-year impact would be modest. Nonetheless – the low-carbon transformation 
will not come for free, which leads naturally to a consideration as to whether households are 
likely to be willing to pay these costs. Ščasný et al. carried out discrete choice experiments 
with households in three European countries (Czech Republic, Poland and UK) in order to 
ascertain their willingness to pay (WTP) for the EU’s climate policy, with the choices being 
the EU’s 2020 emission reduction target (a 20% reduction from 1990’s level by 2020, 
identified as the status quo); the EU’s 2030 target (a 40% reduction from 1990’s level by 
2030); and the EU’s 2050 climate policy (an 80% reduction from 1990’s level). The choices 
also included various cost distribution profiles among the countries and households with 
different income levels or emission volumes. 
 
The results highlighted considerable differences between countries, with UK households’ 
mean WTP being around EUR45 per month for both the 2030 and 2050 emission reduction 
targets; Czech households having a mean WTP of EUR13 for the 2030 choice, and EUR17 
for the 2050 choice; and Polish households having a mean WTP not significantly different 
from zero for either of the post-2020 options. However, the mean values obscure highly 
heterogeneous preferences, with some groups strongly or modestly in favour of abatement, 
and others against. In terms of cost distribution there was broad favour of the polluter pays 
principle, both between and within countries (countries and households with higher emissions 
pay more). As a consequence, the total WTP for the 40% and 80% reduction policy package 
linked to various cost distribution and burden sharing profiles varies considerably for the 
British and the Czech households (EUR36–171 per month in the UK, or EUR8–77 per month 
in the Czech Republic), while it is negative for almost all policy packages in Poland. Such 
results indicate that there are considerable political challenges to be overcome in the EU if it 
is to be able to meet its climate targets. 
 
The kind of systemic energy system transformation envisaged by Solano-Rodriguez et al. will 
require substantial innovation if it is to occur in a manner that is not considerably more costly 
than a fossil fuel-based energy system. Rolling out these innovations will require substantial 
finance if it is to occur across a wide range of low-carbon technologies and result in the 
deployment of the most promising of these technologies at scale. And yet deployment at scale 
will be required to bring about the cost reductions that often result from large-scale 
cumulative deployment of new technologies. The paper by Mazzanti et al. considers the 
financial barriers to these innovations, and how these barriers may be removed. 
 
While financial barriers exist to all kinds of innovation, there are a number of reasons why 
they particularly affect environmental innovations, including higher perceived technological 
risk, higher capital costs with relatively long pay-back times, uncertainties around public 
policy frameworks, the existence of environmentally perverse subsidies that benefit 
competing technologies, the immaturity of both markets and business models, and the 
‘locked-in’, deeply embedded nature of carbon-intensive technologies. 
 
The paper by Mazzanti et al. reports the results of two regression estimations. Data from the 
first comes from a survey of entrepreneurs in the field, who estimate the relative strength of a 
number of these variables’ effects on the financial barriers to environmental innovation, with 
the variables comprising the extent of technological lock-in, uncertainties around market 
demand and return on investment, barriers to entry, the size of firms, and expectations about 
energy prices and regulatory stringency. The second regression estimates how environmental 
innovation is affected by these financial barriers, as well as how it depends on a firm’s 
turnover and on its technological and managerial capabilities, the demand for eco-products, 
the regulatory framework and the availability of external technological information. 
 
The results of the regression seem to confirm two of the paper’s initial hypotheses: that the 
variables from the first regression do act as financial barriers to eco-innovation; and, from the 
second regression, that these barriers do have a significant overall effect on the quantity of 
environmental innovation. These results suggest that public policy will be required address 
and remove the barriers to environmental innovation if the necessary increases in investments 
in such innovation are to be realised. 
 
While the dominant focus of the papers in this Special Issue is EU climate policy, the 
implications of such policy for global GHG emissions are of course important. It is therefore 
appropriate that the final paper in this Special Issue broadens its focus by considering the 
potential impacts on emissions outside the EU from EU policies to increase carbon 
sequestration, and reduce GHG emissions, from land use change within the EU. Gonzalez-
Eguino et al. use the GCAM Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) to explore the possibility 
and extent of terrestrial carbon leakage (TCL), whereby CO2 mitigation from land use or land 
use change in Europe increases the production of food and bioenergy, and associated CO2 
emissions, in other parts of the world. This TCL is compared with the more commonly 
explored industrial carbon leakage (ICL), i.e. increasing fossil fuel use outside Europe as a 
result of EU climate policy. 
 
The climate policy that is implemented in the EU is a carbon tax on all CO2 emissions, 
including those from land use, which when implemented globally results in a convergence in 
per capita emissions in all regions to 0.5tCO2 per head, which is consistent in GCAM with a 
2oC stabilisation of global average temperature. The paper then explores the outcomes of 
different scenarios in which some regions do not participate in this climate policy. This 
simulation produces three main findings: 1) leakage (both TCL and ICL) is largest in absolute 
terms when the biggest developing regions do not implement the climate policy; 2) the 
leakage rate decreases the more regions implement the climate policy; and 3) the TCL 
dominates over ICL up to 2050, but ICL becomes dominant over the second half of the 
century. Clearly these results have important policy implications. While it underlines the 
common finding that the widest possible participation in climate policy is desirable to avoid 
leakage, it also shows that, if broad participation proves not to be possible, significant 
leakage can occur in respect of terrestrial emissions, as well as the more often estimated 
industrial emissions. 
 
In conclusion, it may be noted that the CECILIA2050 project, from which these articles 
emanated, commenced in 2011, and was carried out from 2012 to 2015. It thus took place at a 
time when a global climate policy agreement seemed rather unlikely; at the same time there 
was reason for optimism regarding the EU’s capacity to pursue ambitious, coordinated 
climate and energy policies. In the meantime, things have evolved differently: the adoption of 
the Paris Agreement, including the USA and other major emitters, and with significant 
involvement by the EU, was the first surprise. It remains to be seen whether and to what 
extent the election of President Trump will do damage to the Agreement itself, and/or to the 
new-found enthusiasm for multilateral cooperation on climate policy that inspired it. At the 
same time, the EU finds itself in a turbulent situation: following the Brexit vote, and the rise 
of EU-sceptic parties and movements (some of which also oppose ambitious climate 
policies), the EU’s capacity to lead is challenged – which includes its capacity to lead on 
ambitious climate policies, domestically and internationally. 
 
But while the circumstances are changing, the findings of these papers remain relevant to the 
new situation as well as the old: the future of EU climate policy will hinge on its perceived 
environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and political feasibility; its economic 
efficiency will depend on the extent of environmental innovation and its financial 
attractiveness; and the environmental effectiveness of climate policy globally will depend on 
the extent and nature of participating by the major emitters. This Special Issue with the 
results of this EU research project therefore appears when climate policy is at a crossroads. 
While the focus has been on the EU, the insights generated by this Special Issue are broader; 
which road is taken is likely to depend just as much on how other regions grapple with 
similar issues. 
 
